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Abstract
This paper provides one more step towards bridging the gap between the formal and computational approaches to the verification
of cryptographic protocols. We extend the well-known Abadi–Rogaway logic with probabilistic hashes and give a precise semantic
interpretation to it using Canetti’s oracle hashes. These are probabilistic polynomial-time hashes that hide all partial information.
We show that, under appropriate conditions on the encryption scheme, this interpretation is computationally sound and complete.
This can be used to port security results from the formal world to the computational world when considering passive adversaries.
We also give an explicit example showing that oracle hashing is not strong enough to obtain such a result for active adversaries.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The analysis of security protocols is being carried out mainly by means of two different techniques. On the one
hand, there is the logic approach, which sees messages as algebraic objects defined using some formal language. In
this view, cryptographic operations are symbolic operations which are unbreakable. Attackers are typically modeled
as the so-called Dolev–Yao attackers [19], having total control over the network, having no computational limitations,
and being only (but absolutely) incapable of breaking cryptographic operations. This view is appealing, because it is
relatively easy to use and captures most mistakes commonly made in security protocols.
On the other hand, there is the complexity-based approach. Here messages are bitstrings and cryptographic
operations are functions on bitstrings satisfying certain security properties [33,21,22]. Common security notions like
secrecy, authenticity, and integrity are formulated in terms of the probability that someone can mount a successful
attack. An attacker here is a resource bounded probabilistic algorithm, limited by running time and/or memory. The
complexity-based methods are more general and more realistic, but also more complex to use.
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In the last few years much research has been done to relate these two perspectives [5,4,29,30,24]. Such a relation
takes the form of a function mapping symbolic messages m to (distributions over) bitstrings [[m]]. This map then
should relate messages that are observationally equivalent in the symbolic world (meaning that a Dolev–Yao attacker
can see no difference between them) to indistinguishable distributions over bitstrings (meaning that a computationally
bounded adversary can only with negligible probability distinguish the distributions). Such a map allows one to use
formal methods, possibly even automated, to reason about security properties of protocols and have those reasonings
be valid also in the computational world.
The work carried out in the literature on relating these two perspectives mainly deals with symmetric
encryption [5,29] and public key encryption [30,24]. Several extensions have been proposed dealing, for instance,
with key cycles [1]; partial information leakage [2]; active instead of passive adversaries [30] and more realistic
security notions [6]. Other extensions add new primitives to the logic such as bilinear pairings [27], modular
exponentiation [10], and there are also frameworks dealing with generic equational theories [8,3,26].
Micciancio and Warinschi [29] briefly but explicitly question if this logical approach can be extended to, among
other things, collision resistant hashes. Backes, Pfitzmann, andWaidner [11] show that in their universal composability
framework [31], which deals with active adversaries, a sound interpretation of hashes cannot exist, but that it is
possible to give a sound interpretation of formal hashes in the universal composability framework using random
oracles. Similar results, also in the random oracle model, have been recently shown by Janvier et al. [25] for passive
adversaries and by Cortier et al. [16] for active adversaries. Random oracles are often used in the literature to model
hash functions, although they are also often criticized for being unsound in the standard model; there exist examples
of protocols that are secure in the random oracle model but provably insecure for every possible instantiation with a
real function [15].
The problem with hashes is that in the symbolic world h(m) and h(m′) are indistinguishable for a Dolev–Yao
attacker if the attacker does not know m or m′. In the computational world, however, the normal security definition
– it must be computationally infeasible to compute any pre-image of a hash value or a hash collision [32] – does not
guarantee that the hash function hides all partial information about the message; hence there is no guarantee that their
interpretation as bitstrings [[h(m)]] and [[h(m′)]] are computationally indistinguishable.
A possible solution to this can be found in the work of Canetti and others [13,17] on perfectly one-way functions
(a.k.a. oracle hashing). These are computable probabilistic hash functions that hide all partial information of their
input (see Section 3.3 for the definition and an example).
Our contribution. We propose an extension to the commonly used Abadi–Rogaway logic of symbolic messages
introducing a probabilistic hash operator hr(m) in the logic, next to the probabilistic symmetric encryption operator
{|m|}rk . Just as the original logic introduces a -operator to put in place of undecryptable ciphertexts (for us r ,
since we also deal with repetitions of ciphertexts), we introduce a r -operator to put in place of the hash of an
unknown message. In the computational world, we interpret h as a perfectly one-way functionH. We prove that if the
encryption algorithm E is type-0 secure, the resulting interpretation is sound, extending the result from [5]. The same
result holds if E is IND-CPA. This result previously appeared, in abbreviated form, as [23]. Furthermore, assuming
that the encryption scheme is confusion-free, we prove that the interpretation is complete as well, extending the result
from [29].
For these results, the adversaries under consideration are passive: they do not try to actively modify messages or
insert messages into the network. We show that although an oracle hash scheme allows us to port security results from
the Dolev–Yao setting to the computational setting with respect to passive adversaries, it does not do so with respect
to active adversaries. The reason is the same as for type-0 or IND-CPA encryption schemes: in such an encryption
scheme it might be possible for an attacker to modify an encryption E(κ, µ) of µ to the encryption E(κ, f (µ)) of
another message that has some relation to µ; similarly, in an oracle hash scheme it might be possible for an attacker
to modify the hash of an unknown message µ to the hash of another unknown message that has some relation to
µ. Concretely, we construct an explicit oracle hash scheme in which an adversary can create the hash value H(µ′µ)
given only H(µ) and µ′. We stress that passive adversaries are the best that one can hope for as the standard security
definitions for hash functions or even hash schemes are not resilient against active adversaries.
Overview. Section 2 introduces the message algebra, including the probabilistic encryption and probabilistic
hash operators. It also defines the observational equivalence relation on messages. Section 3 then introduces the
114 F.D. Garcia, P. van Rossum / Theoretical Computer Science 394 (2008) 112–133
computational world, giving the security definitions for encryption and hashes. In Section 4 the semantic interpretation
[[−]] is defined and Section 5 proves the soundness of this interpretation and Section 6 completeness. Section 7
discusses the limitation to passive adversaries. Finally, Section 8 discusses further research directions.
2. The symbolic setting
This section describes the message space and the observational equivalence extending the well-known Abadi–
Rogaway logic [5] of symbolic messages with hashes. These messages are used to describe cryptographic protocols
and the observational equivalence tells whether or not two protocol runs are indistinguishable for a global
eavesdropper. Here a protocol run is simply the concatenation of all the messages exchanged in the run.
Definition 2.1. Key is an infinite set of key symbols, Nonce an infinite set of nonce symbols, Const a finite set of
constant symbols including 0 and 1, and Random an infinite set of randomness labels. Keys are denoted by k, k′, . . . ,
nonces by n, n′, . . . , constants by c, c′, . . . , and randomness labels by r, r ′, . . . . There is one special key called k and
for every randomness label r there is a special nonce called nr. Using these building blocks,messages are constructed
using symbolic encryption, hashing, and pairing operations:
Msg 3 m := c | k | n | {|m|}rk | hr(m) | 〈m,m〉 | r | r .
Here k and n do not range over all keys/nonces, but only over the non-special ones. Special symbols (r and r )
are used to indicate undecryptable ciphertexts or hash values of unknown messages. When interpreting messages as
(ensembles of distributions over) bitstrings, we will treat r as if it were {|0|}rk and r as if it were hr(nr).
A message of the form {|m|}rk is called an encryption and the set of all such messages is denoted by Enc. Similarly,
messages of the form hr(m) are called hash values and the set of all these messages is denoted by Hash. Finally
Box denotes the set of all messages of the form r or r . The set of all messages that involve a “random choice” at
their “top level”, i.e., Key ∪ Nonce ∪ Enc ∪Hash ∪ Box, is denoted by RndMsg. The randomness labels model the
fact that our computational encryption scheme is probabilistic: 〈{|m|}rk, {|m|}rk〉 models a repetition (forwarding) of the
same ciphertext, whereas 〈{|m|}rk, {|m|}r
′
k 〉 models a re-encryption with the same key. Note that our computational hash
scheme, oracle hashing, is also probabilistic; hence, also the symbolic hash function is equipped with randomness
labels.
The closure of a set U of messages is the set of all messages that can be constructed from U using tupling,
detupling, and decryption. It represents the useful information an adversary could deduce knowing U . Note that, due
to one-wayness of a hash function, knowing hr (m) does not provide an adversary with any information about m.
Similarly, and modeling the randomization of the encryption and hash schemes, building new encryptions or hash
values does not give any useful information to the adversary. We also remark that pairs are useful to the adversary for
checking if the argument m of a certain hash value hr(m) can be constructed from other messages he already knows.
In contrast, freshly generated keys, nonces, (randomized) encryptions or (randomized) hash values are of no use to
the adversary as they will not appear in m.
Definition 2.2 (Closure). LetU be a set of messages. The closure ofU , denoted byU , is the smallest set of messages
satisfying:
(1) Const ⊆ U ;
(2) U ⊆ U ;
(3) m,m′ ∈ U =⇒ 〈m,m′〉 ∈ U ;
(4) {|m|}rk, k ∈ U =⇒ m ∈ U ;
(5) 〈m,m′〉 ∈ U =⇒ m,m′ ∈ U .
For the singleton set {m}, we write m instead of {m}.
The function pattern : Msg → Msg is a straightforward extension of the same function in Abadi–Rogaway [5]
which takes a message m and reduces it to a pattern. Intuitively, pattern(m) is the pattern that an attacker sees in a
message m and messages with the same pattern (up to renaming) look the same to her. Encryptions with keys the
attacker cannot learn (i.e., not in m) are replaced by  and hash values of unknown messages by . Since we allow
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repetition of ciphertexts and hash values, we have to distinguish between unknown, but equal, ciphertexts 〈r ,r 〉
and unknown, but distinct, ciphertexts 〈r ,r ′〉 and likewise for hashes.
Definition 2.3. The function pattern : Msg→Msg is defined by
pattern(m) = pattern(m,m),
where we overload pattern by defining pattern : Msg× P(Msg)→Msg as
pattern(〈m1,m2〉,U ) = 〈pattern(m1,U ), pattern(m2,U )〉
pattern({|m|}rk,U ) =
{{|pattern(m,U )|}rk, if k ∈ U ;
R({|m|}rk ), otherwise.
pattern(hr(m),U ) =
{
hr(pattern(m,U )), if m ∈ U ;
R(hr(m)), otherwise.
pattern(m,U ) = m in any other case.
HereR : Enc ∪ Hash ↪→ Random is an injective function that takes an encryption or a hash value and outputs a tag
that identifies its randomness.
The tagging function R is needed to make sure that the function pattern is injective: distinct undecryptable
messages should be replaced by distinct boxes and similarly for hashes. Note that instead of using R one could
also tacitly assume that randomness labels r used in distinct contexts, such as {|m|}rk and {|m′|}r
′
k with m 6= m′, are
always distinct.
Example 2.4. Consider the message m = 〈{|{|1|}r ′k′ , hr˜(n)|}rk, hrˆ(k), k〉. Then pattern(m) = 〈{|s,t |}rk, hrˆ(k), k〉, be-
cause k′, n are not in m, where t = R(hr˜(n)) and s = R({|1|}r ′k′).
Definition 2.5 (Renaming). Two messages m and m′ are said to be equivalent up to renaming, notation m ≈ m′, if
there is a type preserving permutation σ of Key ∪ Nonce ∪ Box ∪ Random such that m = m′σ . Here m′σ denotes
simultaneous substitution of x by σ(x) in m′, for all x ∈ Key ∪ Nonce ∪ Box ∪ Random.
Definition 2.6 (Observational Equivalence). Two messages m and m′ are said to be observationally equivalent,
denoted by m ∼= m′, if pattern(m) ≈ pattern(m′).
In the computational world, security definitions for encryption schemes do not guarantee security when encryption
cycles occur. In the symbolic world, however, this poses no problem. Therefore, as in the original setting in [5], for
the mapping from the symbolic world to the computational world to be sound, we have to forbid encryption cycles in
the symbolic world.
Definition 2.7 (Sub-message). Define the relation sub-message, notation , as the smallest reflexive and transitive
relation onMsg satisfying
(1) m1  〈m1,m2〉
(2) m2  〈m1,m2〉
(3) m  {|m|}rk
(4) m  hr(m) .
Definition 2.8 (Acyclicity). Let m be a message and k, k′ two keys. The key k is said to encrypt k′ in m if m has
a sub-message of the form {|m′|}rk with k′ being a sub-message of m′. A message is said to be acyclic if there is no
sequence k1, k2, . . . , kn, kn+1 = k1 of keys such that ki encrypts ki+1 in m for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
3. The computational setting
This section gives a brief overview of some of the concepts used in the complexity theoretic approach to security
protocols. Much of this is standard; the reader is referred to [20,9] for a thorough treatment of the basic concepts, to
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[5] for the notion of type-0 security for cryptographic schemes (see Section 3.2), and to [13] for the notion of oracle
hashing (see Section 3.3).
In the computational world, messages are elements of Str := {0, 1}∗. Cryptographic algorithms and adversaries
are probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. When analyzing cryptographic primitives, it is customary to consider
probabilistic algorithms that take an element in Param := {1}∗ as input, whose length scales with the security
parameter. By making the security parameter large enough, the system should become arbitrarily hard to break.
This idea is formalized in the security notions of the cryptographic operations. The basic one, which is what is used
to define the notion of semantically equivalent messages, is that of computational indistinguishability of probability
ensembles over Str. Here a probability ensemble over Str is a sequence {Aη}η∈N of probability distributions over Str
indexed by the security parameter.
Definition 3.1 (Computational Indistinguishability). Two probability ensembles {Xη}η∈N and {Yη}η∈N are said to be
computationally indistinguishable, notation {Xη}η ≡ {Yη}η, if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D,
P[x ← Xη; D(1η, x) = 1] − P[x ← Yη; D(1η, x) = 1]
is a negligible function of η.
Recall that a function f : N → N is called negligible if for all positive polynomials p, f (η) ≤ 1/p(η) for large
enough η (i.e., if for all positive polynomials p, there exists an η0 ∈ N such that for all η ∈ N with η > η0,
f (η) ≤ 1/p(η)).
After a brief interlude on probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms in Section 3.1, we give the formal definition of
an encryption scheme and its security notion in Section 3.2 and of oracle hashing in Section 3.3.
3.1. Probabilistic algorithms
In Definition 3.1, the notion of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm was already used. Because we explicitly
use two different views of these algorithms and in order to fix notation, we give a more precise definition.
Definition 3.2. Coins is the set {0, 1}ω, the set of all infinite sequences of 0’s and 1’s. We equip Coins with the
probability distribution obtained by flipping a fair coin for each element in the sequence. To be precise, Coins =
〈{0, 1}ω,F,P〉. Here F is the σ -field on {0, 1}ω generated by the cones {αβ | β ∈ {0, 1}ω}, α ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
P : F → [0, 1] is the unique measure given on the cones by P({αβ | β ∈ {0, 1}ω}) = 2−|α|.
Definition 3.3. The result of running a probabilistic algorithm A on an input x ∈ Str is a probability distribution A(x)
over Str. When we need to explicitly write the randomness used while running A, we write A(x, ρ) with ρ ∈ Coins.
Using this notation, P[A(x) = y] = P[ρ ← Coins; A(x, ρ) = y]. When confusion is unlikely, we will also denote
the support of this probability distribution, {y ∈ Str|P[ρ ← Coins; A(x, ρ) = y)] > 0}, by A(x).
Now suppose that A runs in polynomial time p. Then running A on x cannot use more than p(|x |) coin flips.
Letting Coinsp(|x |) denote the uniform probability distribution on {0, 1}p(|x |), we can also write P[A(x) = y] =
P[ρ ← Coinsp(|x |); A(x, ρ) = y].
3.2. Encryption scheme
For each security parameter η ∈ N we let Plaintextη ⊆ Str be a non-empty set of plaintexts, satisfying that for
each η ∈ N : Plaintextη ⊆ Plaintextη+1 as in Goldwasser and Bellare [20]. Let us define Plaintext =⋃η Plaintextη.
There is a set Keys ⊆ Str of keys and also a set Ciphertext ⊆ Str of ciphertexts. Furthermore, there is a special
bitstring ⊥ not appearing in Plaintext or Ciphertext. An encryption scheme Π consists of three algorithms:
(1) a (probabilistic) key generation algorithm K : Param→ Keys that outputs, given a unary sequence of length η,
a randomly chosen element of Keys;
(2) a (probabilistic) encryption algorithm E : Keys×Str→ Ciphertext∪{⊥} that returns, given a key and a bitstring,
an element from Ciphertext or ⊥;
(3) a (deterministic) decryption algorithmD : Keys×Str→ Plaintext∪{⊥} that returns, given a key and a ciphertext,
an element from Plaintext or ⊥.
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These algorithms must satisfy that the decryption (with the correct key) of a ciphertext returns the original plaintext.
The element ⊥ is used to indicate failure of en- or decryption, although, before hand, there is no requirement that
decrypting with the wrong key yields ⊥. Now we define type-0 security of an encryption scheme as in [5], which is a
variant of the standard semantic security definition, enhanced with some extra properties. In particular a type-0 secure
encryption scheme is which-key concealing, repetition concealing and length hiding. We refer to the original paper
for motivation and explanations on how to achieve such an encryption scheme. The notion of type-0 security makes
slightly unrealistic assumptions on the encryption scheme. However our result on hashes does not significantly depend
on the specific security notion for the encryption scheme. As in [28,24,7], it is possible to replace type-0 security by
the standard notion of IND-CPA or IND-CCA by adapting the definition of pattern. For simplicity of the exposition,
throughout this paper we adopt the former security notion.
Definition 3.4. An adversary (for type-0 security) is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm AF(−),G(−) : Param→
{0, 1} having access to two probabilistic oracles F,G : Str→ Str. The advantage of such an adversary is the function
AdvA : N→ R defined by
AdvA(η) = P[κ, κ ′← K(1η); AE(κ,−),E(κ ′,−)(1η) = 1] − P[κ ← K(1η); AE(κ,0),E(κ,0)(1η) = 1].
Here the probabilities are taken over the choice of κ and κ ′ by the key generation algorithm, over the internal coins
used by the oracles, and over the internal choices of A. An encryption scheme 〈K, E,D〉 is called type-0 secure if for
all polynomial-time adversaries A as above, the advantage AdvA is a negligible function of η.
In the sequel we need an extra assumption on the encryption scheme, namely that the ciphertexts are well-spread
as a function of the coins tosses of E . It means that for all plaintexts µ and all keys κ , no ciphertext is exceptionally
likely to occur as the encryption of µ under κ . Note that this does not follow from, nor implies type-0 security. Also
note that every encryption scheme running in cipher block chaining mode automatically has this property: the initial
vector provides the required randomness.
Definition 3.5 (Well-spread). An encryption scheme 〈K, E,D〉 is said to be well-spread if
sup
x∈Ciphertext,κ∈K(1η),µ∈Plaintextη
P[E(κ, µ) = x]
is a negligible function of η.
For completeness it is needed that the decryption algorithm returns reject whenever it is called with a key that was
not used to encrypt the message in the first place. The special bitstring ⊥ is used to indicate failure of decryption.
This property is called confusion freeness. See [29], where the completeness for the original Abadi–Rogaway logic is
proven.
Definition 3.6 (Confusion Freeness). LetΠ = 〈K, E,D〉 be an encryption scheme indexed by the security parameter
η. Π is said to be confusion free if for all bitstrings µ the probability
P
[
κ1, κ2← K(η) : Dκ1
(Eκ2(µ)) 6= ⊥]
is a negligible function of η.
3.3. Oracle hashing
The underlying secrecy assumptions behind formal or Dolev–Yao hashes [19] are very strong. It is assumed that
given a hash value f (x), it is not possible for an adversary to learn any information about the pre-image x . In the
literature this idealization is often modeled with the random oracle [12]. Such a primitive is not computable and
therefore it is also an idealization. Practical hash functions like SHA or MD5 are very useful cryptographic primitives
but have no proven security guaranties. Moreover, under the traditional security notions (one-wayness), a function that
reveals half of its input might still be secure. In addition, any deterministic hash function f leaks partial information
about x , namely f (x) itself. Throughout this paper we consider a new primitive introduced by Canetti [13] called
oracle hashing, that mimics what semantic security is for encryption schemes. This hash function is probabilistic and
therefore it needs a verification function, just as in a signature scheme. A hash scheme consists of two algorithms
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H and V . The probabilistic algorithm H : Param × Str → Str takes a unary sequence and a message and outputs
a hash value; the verification algorithm V : Str × Str → {0, 1} that given two messages x and c correctly decides
whether c is a hash of x or not. As an example we reproduce here a hash scheme proposed in the original paper.
Let p be a large (i.e., scaling with η) safe prime (i.e., a prime of the form 2q + 1 where q is also prime). Take
H(x) = 〈r2 mod p, r2· f (x) mod p〉, where r is a randomly chosen element in Z∗p and f is any collision resistant
hash function. The verification algorithm V(x, 〈a, b〉) just checks whether b = a f (x) mod p.
We consider two security notions for such a hash scheme. The first one, proposed by Canetti [13] and later revisited
in [17], oracle indistinguishability, guarantees that an adversary can gain no information at all about a bitstring, given
its hash value (or rather, with sufficiently small probability). The second one, more standard, is an appropriate form
of collision resistance. It guarantees that an adversary cannot (or rather, again, with sufficiently small probability)
compute two distinct messages that successfully pass the verification test with the same hash value.
Definition 3.7 (Oracle Indistinguishability). A hash scheme 〈H,V〉 is said to be oracle indistinguishable if for every
family of probabilistic polynomial-time predicates {Dη : Str→ {0, 1}}η∈N and every positive polynomial p there is a
polynomial size family {Lη}η∈N of subsets of Str such that for all large enough η and all x, y ∈ Str \ Lη:
P[Dη(H(1η, x)) = 1] − P[Dη(H(1η, y)) = 1] < 1p(η) .
Here the probabilities are taken over the choices made by H and the choices made by Dη. This definition is the non-
uniform [22] version of oracle indistinguishability proposed by Canetti [13] as it is used in the proofs in Appendix B
of the full version [14].
Definition 3.8 (Collision Resistance). A hash scheme 〈H,V〉 is said to be collision resistant if for every probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A, the probability
P[〈c, x, y〉 ← A(1η); x 6= y ∧ V(x, c) = V(y, c) = 1]
is a negligible function of η.
4. Interpretation
Section 2 describes a setting where messages are symbolic terms generated by some grammar. In Section 3
messages are bitstrings and operations are given by probabilistic algorithms operating on bitstrings. This section
shows how to map symbolic messages to (distributions over) bitstrings. This interpretation is very much standard.
We refer to [5,4,29] for a thorough explanation. In particular this section introduces notation that allows us to assign,
beforehand, some of the random coin flips used for the computation of the interpretation of a message. This notation
becomes useful throughout the soundness proof.
Tagged representation. Throughout this paper we assume that it is always possible to recover the type information
of a message from its bitstring representation. This can be easily achieved by adding the necessary type tags to the
bitstring representation. We will abstract from this representation by overloading the notation. We use Greek letters
for bitstrings and µ represents a bitstring of a generic type. We write µ1µ2 for a pair of bitstrings (in [5] this would be
written as 〈(µ1, µ2), “pair”〉);  for a ciphertext; κ for a key; ψ for a hash value; ν for a nonce and ς for a constant.
Definition 4.1. For every message m we define the set R(m) ⊆Msg of random messages in m as follows:
R(c) = ∅ R({|m|}rk) = R(m) ∪ {k, {|m|}rk}
R(n) = {n} R(hr(m)) = R(m) ∪ {hr(m)}
R(k) = {k} R(〈m1,m2〉) = R(m1) ∪ R(m2)
R(r ) = {k,r } R(r ) = {nr,r }.
Note that R(m) is nearly equal to the set of all sub-messages of m that are in RndMsg; the only difference is that
R(m) also may contain the special key k or special nonces nr. When interpreting a message m as (ensembles of
distributions over) bitstrings (Definition 4.3), we will first choose a sequence of coin flips for all elements of R(m)
and use these sequences as source of randomness for the appropriate interpretation algorithms.
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Definition 4.2. For every finite subset X ofRndMsgwe define Coins(X) as {τ | τ : X → Coins}. We equip Coins(X)
with the induced product probability distribution. Furthermore, for every message m we write Coins(m) instead of
Coins(R(m)).
An element of τ of Coins(m) gives, for every sub-message m′ of m that requires random choices when interpreting
this sub-message as a bitstring, an infinite sequence τ(m′) of coin flips that will be used to resolve the randomness.
Now we are ready to give semantic to our message algebra. We use E to interpret encryptions, K to interpret key
symbols, and H to interpret hashes. We let C : Const→ Str be a function that (deterministically) assigns a constant
bitstring to each constant identifier. We let N : Param → Str be the nonce generation function that, given a unary
sequence of length η, chooses uniformly and randomly a bitstring from {0, 1}η.
Definition 4.3. For a message m, a value of the security parameter η ∈ N, a finite setU of messages containing R(m),
and a τ ∈ Coins(U ), we can (deterministically) create a bitstring [[m]]τη ∈ Str as follows:
[[c]]τη = C(c) [[{|m|}rk]]τη = E([[k]]τη, [[m]]τη, τ ({|m|}rk))
[[k]]τη = K(1η, τ (k)) [[hr(m)]]τη = H(1η, [[m]]τη, τ (hr(m)))
[[n]]τη = N (1η, τ (n)) [[r ]]τη = E([[k]]τη, C(0), τ (r ))
[[〈m1,m2〉]]τη = [[m1]]τη[[m2]]τη [[r ]]τη = H(1η, [[nr]]τη, τ (r )).
Note that [[m]]τη = [[m]]τ |R(m)η . For a fixed message m and η ∈ N, choosing τ from the probability distribution
Coins(R(m)) creates a probability distribution [[m]]η over Str:
[[m]]η := [τ ← Coins(m); [[m]]τη].
Note that although the codomain of τ ∈ Coins(m) is Coins, the set of infinite bitstrings, when interpreting a fixed
message m at a fixed value of the security parameter η, only a predetermined finite initial segment of each sequence of
coin flips will be used byK,N , E , andH (cf. Definition 3.3). In fact, because these four algorithms run in polynomial
time, for every message m there exists a polynomial pm such that every call to one of these four algorithms uses at
most the first pm(η) elements of τ . Now define Coinsη(m) = {τ | τ : R(m) → {0, 1}pm (η)} and equip this with the
uniform probability distribution. Then we can also write
[[m]]η = [τ ← Coinsη(m); [[m]]τη].
Furthermore, letting η range over N creates an ensemble of probability distributions [[m]] over Str, namely [[m]] :=
{[[m]]η}η∈N.
4.1. Partial interpretation
For technical reasons throughout the soundness proof, we need to compute the interpretation of a symbolic message
while part of its randomness has already been chosen. This section introduces straightforward notation to do so.
Definition 4.4. For every messagem andm′ we define the set R(m,m′) ⊆ RndMsg of random messages in m relative
to m′ as follows: if m = m′, then R(m,m′) = ∅, otherwise
R(c,m′) = ∅ R({|m|}rk,m′) = R(m,m′) ∪ {k, {|m|}rk}
R(n,m′) = {n} R(hr(m),m′) = R(m,m′) ∪ {hr(m)}
R(k,m′) = {k} R(〈m1,m2〉,m′) = R(m1,m′) ∪ R(m2,m′)
R(r ,m′) = {k,r } R(r ,m′) = {nr,r }.
Note that R(m,m′) is the set of all random messages in m except those that only occur as a sub-message of m′.
Example 4.5. Let m be the message 〈k, {|0|}rk, hr
′
({|0|}rk, n), n′〉 and let m˜ be the message inside the hash: 〈{|0|}rk, n〉.
Then the randomness in m is R(m) = {k, {|0|}rk, hr
′
({|0|}rk, n), n′, n}, the randomness inside the hash is R(m˜) = {{|0|}rk,
k, n}, and the randomness that occurs only outside the hash is R(m, hr ′(m˜)) = R(m) \ {hr ′(m˜), n}. The randomness
that is shared between the inside of the hash and the outside of the hash is R(m, hr
′
(m˜)) ∩ R(m˜) = {k, {|0|}rk}.
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We will need a way of interpreting a message as a bitstring when the interpretation of certain sub-messages has
already been chosen in some other way.
Definition 4.6. Let η ∈ N, let e be a function from Dom(e) ⊆Msg to Str and let τ ∈ Coinsη(U \ Dom(e)) with U a
finite set of messages containing R(m). We interpret a message m using e whenever possible. Otherwise, we use the
coin flips assigned by τ to generate an interpretation. If m ∈ Dom(e), then [[m]]e,τη = e(m), else
[[c]]e,τη = C(c) [[{|m|}rk]]e,τη = E([[k]]τη, [[m]]e,τη , τ ({|m|}rk))
[[k]]e,τη = K(1η, τ (k)) [[hr(m)]]e,τη = H(1η, [[m]]e,τη , τ (hr(m)))
[[n]]e,τη = N (1η, τ (n)) [[r ]]e,τη = E([[k]]e,τη , C(0), τ (r ))
[[〈m1,m2〉]]e,τη = [[m1]]e,τη [[m2]]e,τη [[r ]]e,τη = H(1η, [[nr]]e,τη , τ (r )).
We also need a way of pre-specifying some of the random choices to be made when interpreting a message.
Definition 4.7. Let η ∈ N and let τ ∈ Coinsη(U ) for some finite set of messages U . Then for every message m, the
distribution [[m]]τη is obtained by randomly choosing coins for the remaining randomness labels in m. Formally,
[[m]]τη := [τ ′← Coinsη(R(m) \U ); [[m]]τ∪τ
′
η ],
where τ ∪ τ ′ ∈ Coinsη(m) denotes the function which agrees with τ on U ∩ R(m) and with τ ′ on R(m) \U .
This can also be combined with the previous way of preselecting a part of the interpretation. For a function e from
a set Dom(e) ⊆Msg to Str and τ ∈ Coinsη(U ) as above, we define
[[m]]e,τη := [τ ′← Coinsη(R(m) \U ); [[m]]e,τ∪τ
′
η ].
5. Soundness
This section shows that the interpretation proposed in the previous section is computationally sound. Throughout
this section we assume that the encryption scheme 〈K, E,D〉 is type-0 secure (or IND-CCA with pattern modified as
in [24,28]) and well-spread, and that the probabilistic hash scheme 〈H,V〉 is oracle indistinguishable and collision
resistant.
In order to isolate our contribution, we split the function pattern in two parts: one replacing the encryptions and one
replacing the hashes. We define the function encpat as in Abadi–Rogaway [5] which takes a message m and reduces
it to a pattern. This function does not replace hashes.
Definition 5.1. The function encpat : Msg→Msg is defined as follows
encpat(m) = encpat(m,m),
where encpat : Msg× P(Msg)→Msg is defined by
encpat(〈m1,m2〉,U ) = 〈encpat(m1,U ), encpat(m2,U )〉
encpat({|m|}rk,U ) =
{{|encpat(m,U )|}rk, if k ∈ U ;
R({|m|}rk ), otherwise.
encpat(hr(m),U ) = hr(encpat(m,U ))
encpat(m,U ) = m in any other case.
Now we define the function hashpat which takes a message m and reduces all hashes of unknown (not in m)
sub-messages, to . This function does not replace encryptions.
Definition 5.2. Define the function hashpat : Msg→Msg as
hashpat(m) = hashpat(m,m),
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where hashpat : Msg× P(Msg)→Msg is defined by
hashpat(〈m1,m2〉,U ) = 〈hashpat(m1,U ), hashpat(m2,U )〉
hashpat({|m|}rk,U ) = {|hashpat(m,U )|}rk
hashpat(hr(m),U ) =
{
hr(hashpat(m,U )), if m ∈ U ;
R(hr(m)), otherwise.
hashpat(m,U ) = m in any other case.
Lemma 5.3. pattern ≈ encpat ◦ hashpat.
Proof. A straightforward induction on m shows that m = hashpat(m). Using this, another straightforward induction
on m shows that pattern(m) ≈ encpat(hashpat(m)). 
Theorem 5.4 (Abadi–Rogaway). Let m be an acyclic message. Suppose that for every sub-message hr(m˜) of m,
m˜ ∈ m. Then [[m]] ≡ [[encpat(m)]].
Proof. The proof follows just like in Abadi–Rogaway [5]. Interpreting hashes here is straightforward because their
argument is always known, by assumption. We refer the reader to the original paper for a full proof. 
Before starting the proof of the soundness theorem, we give a sketch for an easy case and point out where the
technical problems in the general case are. Consider two messages h(n, 0)n′ and h(n, 1)n′. These are observationally
equivalent and we have to prove that [[h(n, 0), n′]] and [[h(n, 1), n′]] are computationally indistinguishable. The
way to prove this is standard: we assume that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that can
distinguish these two ensembles of probability distributions and use it to build an adversary D that breaks the oracle
indistinguishability of the hash scheme 〈H,V〉. What D has to do is clear: it receives a hash value α which is either
H(1η, ν0) or H(1η, ν1), and has to guess which one it is. It generates a nonce ν′ and calls A on αν′. Since A can
successfully distinguishH(1η, ν0)ν′ fromH(1η, ν1)ν′, this enables D to break oracle indistinguishability.
A problem occurs in the case of the messages h(n, n′)n′ and h(n, 1)n′. Receiving a hash value α which is either
H(1η, νν′) orH(1η, ν1), D cannot just generate a nonce ν′′ and call A on αν′′: the distribution ofH(1η, νν′)ν′ is not
equal to that of H(1η, νν′)ν′′. The technical solution is to provide the adversary D with access to ν′; this is enough
to prove that oracle indistinguishability can then be broken. What is still needed is that the inside of the hash is still
“random enough” even if part of it is revealed; in this particular case this means that revealing ν′, the inside of that
hash is still hidden to D.
We now first prove, in general, that it is safe to reveal some of the randomness inside the hash. More accurately,
if you pre-specify some, but not all, of the sequences of coins to be chosen when interpreting a message m, then
no single bitstring x is exceptionally likely to occur as the interpretation of m. After this lemma, we can prove the
soundness result.
Lemma 5.5. Let m be a message, U  R(m). Let p be a positive polynomial. Then, for large enough η
∀τ ∈ Coinsη(U ).∀x ∈ Str : P[α← [[m]]τη;α = x] <
1
p(η)
.
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the structure of m.
• Consider the case m = 〈m1,m2〉. We get by induction hypothesis that the statement holds either for m1 or
m2, which suffices for the proof given that concatenating a bitstring might just lower the probability of hitting
a particular element.
• The cases m = {|m1|}rk and m = r are trivial due to well-spreadness (Definition 3.5).
• The cases r and m = hr(m1) follow from collision resistance (Definition 3.8).
• The case m = c does not occur since U must be a proper subset of R(c) = ∅.
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• If m is a nonce n, thenU = ∅ since it must be a proper subset of R(n) = {n}. Then P[α← [[n]]τη;α = x] = 2−η <
1/p(η).
• If m is a key k, then again U = ∅. Suppose that for infinitely many η there is a τ ∈ Coinsη(U ) and an x ∈ Str for
which
P[α← [[k]]τη;α = x] = P[α← K(1η);α = x] ≥
1
p(η)
. (1)
Now we build an adversary AF(−),G(−) : Param→ {0, 1} that breaks type-0 security.
algorithm AF(−),G(−)(1η) :
ν ← N (1η)
 ← F(ν)
κ ← K(1η)
if D(κ, ) = ν return 1
else return 0
This adversary generates a random nonce ν and gives it to the oracle F to encrypt. The adversary tries to guess if
the oracle was instantiated with E(k,−) or with E(k, 0) by simply randomly generating a key itself and trying to
decrypt. We will show that the probability that the oracle and the adversary choose the same key is non-negligible
and hence the probability that this adversary guesses correctly is also non-negligible. Omitting G as it is not used
by A, we get
AdvA(η) = P[κ ← K(1η); ν ← N (1η);  ← E(κ, ν); κ ′← K(1η);D(κ ′, ) = ν]
− P[κ ← K(1η); ν ← N (1η);  ← E(κ, 0); κ ′← K(1η);D(κ ′, ) = ν]
≥ P[κ, κ ′← K(1η); κ = κ ′]
−
∑
y∈{0,1}η
P[ν ← N (1η); y = ν] · P[κ, κ ′← K(1η);  ← E(κ, 0);D(κ ′, ) = y]
(because it is always possible to decrypt with the proper key)
≥ 1
p(η)2
− 2−η
∑
y∈{0,1}η
P[κ, κ ′← K(1η);  ← E(κ, 0);D(κ ′, ) = y]
(bounding the first term by the probability of getting x two times)
≥ 1
p(η)2
− 2−η
∑
κ0,κ
′
0,0
(
P[κ, κ ′← K(1η); κ = κ0; κ ′ = κ ′0; E(κ, 0) = 0]
·
∑
y∈{0,1}η
P[D(κ ′0, 0) = y]
)
≥ 1
p(η)2
− 2−η ≥ 1
p(η)3
(for large enough η). 
Theorem 5.6. Let m be a message with a sub-message of the form hr(m˜). Assume that m˜ 6∈ m. Take m′ := m[hr(m˜) :=
s], where s = R(hr(m˜)). Then [[m]] ≡ [[m′]].
Proof. Assume that [[m]] 6≡ [[m′]], say A : Param× Str→ {0, 1} is a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary and p
a positive polynomial such that
1
p(η)
≤ P[µ← [[m]]η; A(1η, µ) = 1] − P[µ← [[m′]]η; A(1η, µ) = 1] (2)
for infinitely many η ∈ N. We will use this to build a distinguisher as in Definition 3.7 that breaks oracle
indistinguishability of 〈H,V〉.
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Let η ∈ N, abbreviate R(m, m˜) ∩ R(m˜) to U and let τ ∈ Coinsη(U ). Note that τ chooses coin flips for the shared
randomness between the inside and the outside of the hash. Then define a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
Dτη : {0, 1}∗→ {0, 1} as follows.
algorithm Dτη (α) :
µ← [[m]]{hr(m˜)7→α},τη
β ← A(η, µ)
return β
This algorithm tries to guess if a given bitstring α was drawn from [[hr(m˜)]]τη or from [[s]]τη = [[hs(ns)]]τη . It does
so by computing an interpretation for m as follows. The sub-message hr(m˜) is interpreted as α; the randomness that
is shared between the inside of the hash (m˜) and the rest of the message is resolved using hard-coded sequences
of coin flips τ . It then uses the adversary A to guess if the resulting interpretation was drawn from [[m]]η (in
which case it guesses that α was drawn from [[hr(m˜)]]η) or from [[m′]]η (in which case it guesses that α was drawn
from [[s]]η).
Note that for every η and τ we have a different algorithm Dτη that has hardcoded coin flips for the shared
randomness. However we do not have a single algorithm taking η and α as arguments since such an algorithm would
need an infinite sequence of hardcoded coin flips.
Now consider one of the infinitely many values of η for which (2) holds. Using Dτη we can rephrase (2) as follows:
1
p(η)
≤ P[τ ← Coinsη(U ), α← [[hr(m˜)]]τη; Dτη (α) = 1] − P[τ ← Coinsη(U ), α← [[s]]τη; Dτη (α) = 1]
=
∑
τ∈Coinsη(U )
(
P[α← [[hr(m˜)]]τη; Dτη (α) = 1]
−P[α← [[s]]τη; Dτη (α) = 1]
)
· P[T ← Coinsη(U ); T = τ ]
=
∑
τ∈Coinsη(U )
(
P[α← [[m˜]]τη; Dτη (H(1η, α)) = 1]
−P[α← [[ns]]τη; Dτη (H(1η, α)) = 1]
)
· P[T ← Coinsη(U ); T = τ ]
= 1|Coinsη(U )|
∑
τ∈Coinsη(U )
(
P[α← [[m˜]]τη; Dτη (H(1η, α)) = 1] − P[α← [[ns]]τη; Dτη (H(1η, α)) = 1]
)
.
Note that τ selects the randomness that is shared between the inside of the hash and the outside of the hash; when
α is drawn from [[m˜]]τη the randomness that appears only inside the hash is chosen (and the assumption on m˜ means
that there is really something to choose); H chooses the randomness for taking the hash; and Dτη itself resolves
the randomness that appears only outside the hash. This means that there must be a particular value of τ , say τ¯η,
such that
1
p(η)
≤ P[α← [[m˜]]τ¯ηη ; Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] − P[α← [[ns]]τ¯ηη ; D
τ¯η
η (H(1η, α)) = 1]. (3)
Gathering all D
τ¯η
η together for the various values of η, let D be the non-uniform adversary {Dτ¯ηη }η∈N. Note that we
have not actually defined D
τ¯η
η for all η, but only for those (infinitely many) for which (2) actually holds. What D does
for the other values of η is irrelevant.
We will now show that D breaks the oracle indistinguishability of 〈H,V〉. For this, let L = {Lη}η∈N be a
polynomial size family of subsets of Str. We have to show that for infinitely many values of η, there are x, y ∈ Str\Lη
such that D meaningfully distinguishes betweenH(1η, x) andH(1η, y).
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Once again, take one of the infinitely many values of η for which (2) holds. Continuing from (3), we get
1
p(η)
≤
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] · P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α]
−
∑
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
=
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη
[
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] · P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
− P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1] · P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
(since
∑
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη
P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β] = 1 and
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη P[[[m˜]]
τ¯η
η = α] = 1)
=
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] − P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη \Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] − P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη \Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] − P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
(splitting cases on ∈ Lη and 6∈ Lη)
≤
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] · P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη \Lη
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] · P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη \Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] − P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
(since P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1] ≥ 0)
≤
∑
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β] +
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη ∩Lη
P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α]
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη \Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] − P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
(since P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] ≤ 1,∑
α∈[[m]]τ¯ηη P[[[m˜]]
τ¯η
η = α] = 1 and ∑β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη \LηP[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β] ≤ 1)
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≤ 1
2p(η)
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη \Lη
[(
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] − P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1]
)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
]
. (4)
(by Lemma 5.5 (2x) using the polynomial 4p(η)|Lη|, provided that η is large)
Now suppose that for all α ∈ [[m˜]]τ¯ηη \ Lη and all β ∈ [[ns]]τ¯ηη \ Lη we have
P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] − P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1] < 12p(η) .
Then, continuing from (4), we get a contradiction:
1
p(η)
<
1
2p(η)
+
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη \Lη
1
2p(η)
· P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
= 1
2p(η)
+ 1
2p(η)
∑
α∈[[m˜]]τ¯ηη \Lη
β∈[[ns]]τ¯ηη \Lη
P[[[m˜]]τ¯ηη = α] · P[[[ns]]τ¯ηη = β]
≤ 1
2p(η)
+ 1
2p(η)
.
Therefore, there must be an α ∈ [[m˜]]τ¯ηη \ Lη and a β ∈ [[ns]]τ¯ηη \ Lη such that
1
2p(η)
≤ P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, α)) = 1] − P[Dτ¯ηη (H(1η, β)) = 1].
Hence D breaks oracle indistinguishability, contradicting the assumption on 〈H,V〉. 
Theorem 5.7 (Soundness). Let m and m′ be acyclic messages. Then m ∼= m′ =⇒ [[m]] ≡ [[m′]].
Proof. The assumption that m ∼= m′ means that pattern(m) ≈ pattern(m′). Therefore we get [[pattern(m)]] =
[[pattern(m′)]]. Next, by Lemma 5.3 we get [[encpat ◦ hashpat(m)]] = [[encpat ◦ hashpat(m′)]]. Now, by applying
Theorem 5.4 two times, we obtain [[hashpat(m)]] ≡ [[hashpat(m′)]]. Finally, we start with m and repeatedly apply
Theorem 5.6, replacing one hash at a time by, and arrive at hashpat(m). This shows that [[m]] ≡ [[hashpat(m)]] and
similarly [[m′]] ≡ [[hashpat(m′)]]. Therefore [[m]] ≡ [[m′]]. 
6. Completeness
Although soundness results allow us to port proofs of secrecy properties from the symbolic world to the
computational world, it does not permit to port, for instance, authenticity and integrity results. For example, consider
a protocol in which an agent A chooses a nonce n and commits to this nonce by sending h(n) to another agent B.
Later in the protocol, A will reveal the nonce n by sending n itself to B. Security in this setting means that A cannot
change her choice after sending h(n). In the symbolic world, this is guaranteed by the fact that the message h(n)n (the
concatenation of the relevant messages in the protocol run) is observationally distinct from h(n)n′, with n′ 6= n. We
would like to be able to conclude from this symbolic property that [[h(n)n]] is computationally distinct from [[h(n)n′]],
since that is needed to guarantee the security in the computational world.
What is needed here is completeness: computational equivalence of [[m]] and [[m′]] should imply observational
equivalence of m and m′. For the original Abadi–Rogaway logic, completeness under appropriate conditions on the
encryption scheme was proven by Micciancio and Warinschi [29].
This section now shows that the interpretation proposed in the Section 4 is complete. Throughout this section
we assume that the encryption scheme 〈K, E,D〉 is type-0 secure, well-spread, and confusion free, and that the
probabilistic hash scheme 〈H,V〉 is collision resistant and oracle indistinguishable.
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Throughout the completeness proof we follow the steps of Micciancio–Warinschi and their notation when possible.
We recall here some of their results as they are used in our proof.
In the original Abadi–Rogaway logic, the useful information for an adversary is determined by the set of keys she
can learn. We define the function arecover and its computational counterpart brecover as in [29]. There they are called
recoverable and getkeys. These functions extract the set of keys observable by an adversary from a symbolic message
and a bitstring respectively.
Definition 6.1. The function arecover : Msg→ P(Key) is defined by
arecover(m) = arecover(m, |m|),
where arecover : Msg× N→ P(Key) is given by
arecover(m, 0) = ∅
arecover(m, d + 1) = Fkr(m, arecover(m, d))
and Fkr : Msg× P(Key)→ P(Key) is given by
Fkr(〈m1,m2〉,U ) = Fkr(m1,U ) ∪ Fkr(m2,U )
Fkr(k,U ) = {k} ∪U
Fkr({|m|}rk,U ) = Fkr(m,U ), if k ∈ U ;
Fkr(m,U ) = U, in any other case.
The function brecover : Str→ P(Keys) is defined by
algorithm brecover(µ) :
Gets all the keys in the bitstring µ with
high probability.
U ′ := ∅
do:
U := U ′
U ′ := Ckr(µ,U )
until U = U ′
return U
where Ckr : Msg× P(Keys)→ P(Keys) is defined by
Ckr(κ,U ) = {κ} ∪U
Ckr(µ1µ2,U ) = Ckr(µ1,U ) ∪ Ckr(µ2,U )
Ckr(,U ) = Ckr(µ,U ), if ∃!κ ∈ U s.t. D(, κ) = µ 6= ⊥;
Ckr(µ,U ) = U, otherwise.
Note that brecover can be computed in polynomial time: we can assume without loss of generality that the size of
the output of the decryption algorithm is smaller than the input ciphertext (since the encryption scheme is randomized).
Then Ckr recurses a linear number of times and every iteration of the until loop of brecover adds at least one key to
U ′ and therefore the number of iterations is bounded by the maximum number of keys in µ.
The following lemma also from [29] shows the relation between these two functions.
Lemma 6.2. Let Π = 〈K, E,D〉 be a confusion free encryption scheme and let m ∈Msg. Then
P[τ ← Coinsη(m); brecover([[m]]τη) 6= [[arecover(m)]]τη]
is a negligible function of η.
Proof. We refer the reader to the original paper for a complete proof of this lemma. The hashes that appear in our
logic have no influence at all. 
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In our extended logic, due to the hashes, it is not true any more that the only useful information for an adversary
is the set of keys. Any message an adversary can learn might be the pre-image of a certain hash value. Therefore, we
need to be able to compute the closure (up to a certain size) of a given message or bitstring. For this reason the closure
operators defined below are closed (up to a certain size) under pairing but not under encryption or hashing.
Definition 6.3. The function aclosure : Msg × N → P(Msg) computes the messages in the symbolic closure of a
message, up to a certain size d:
aclosure(m, d) = aclosure(m, d, arecover(m)),
where aclosure : Msg× N× P(Key)→ P(Msg) is given by
aclosure(m, d,U ) = asynth(aanalz(m,U ), d).
Here the function aanalz : Msg×P(Msg)→ P(Msg), defined below, splits a message in all its meaningful subterms,
using the keys in U , when possible, for decrypting.
aanalz(〈m1,m2〉,U ) = aanalz(m1,U ) ∪ aanalz(m2,U )
aanalz({|m|}rk,U ) = {{|m|}rk} ∪ aanalz(m,U ), if k ∈ U ;
aanalz(m,U ) = {m}, in any other case.
The function asynth : P(Msg)× N→ P(Msg) generates all possible vectors of messages in U of size up to d:
algorithm asynth(U, d) :
U1 = U
for i = 2 to d
Ui := ∅
for each m ∈ U
for each v ∈ Ui−1
Ui := Ui ∪ {〈m, v〉}
return Ud
algorithm bsynth(U, d) :
U1 = U
for i = 2 to d
Ui := ∅
for each µ ∈ U
for each ω ∈ Ui−1
Ui := Ui ∪ {µω}
return Ud
Next, the functions bclosure : Str × N→ P(Str), banalz : Str × P(Str)→ P(Str) and bsynth : P(Str) × N→
P(Str) are the computational counterparts of aclosure, aanalz and asynth respectively:
bclosure(µ, d) = bclosure(µ, d, brecover(µ)),
where bclosure : Str× N× P(Keys)→ P(Str) is defined by
bclosure(µ, d,U ) = bsynth(banalz(µ,U ), d)
and
banalz(µ1µ2,U ) = banalz(µ1,U ) ∪ banalz(µ2,U )
banalz(,U ) = {} ∪ banalz(µ,U ), if ∃!κ ∈ Us.t.D(, κ) = µ 6= ⊥;
banalz(µ,U ) = {µ}, in any other case.
Note that for a fixed d ∈ N, bclosure(µ, d) can be computed in a time that is polynomial in |µ|.
Now we show that the proposed functions behave similarly with high probability.
Lemma 6.4. Let m ∈Msg, d ∈ N and T ⊆ Key. Then the probability
P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); bclosure([[m]]τη, d, [[T ]]τη) 6= [[aclosure(m, d, T )]]τη
]
is a negligible function of η.
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Proof. We prove by induction on the structure of m that the probability
P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη, [[T ]]τη) 6= [[aanalz(m, T )]]τη
]
is a negligible function of η. The original statement follows from this, using that asynth and bsynth have similar
behavior.
The only non-trivial case is that of m = {|m1|}rk .
• If k ∈ T , then [[k]]τη ∈ [[T ]]τη . Next
P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη, [[T ]]τη) = [[aanalz(m, T )]]τη]
= P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη, [[T ]]τη) = [[{m} ∪ aanalz(m1, T )]]τη]
≥ P[τ ← Coinsη(m); [[m]]τη ∪ banalz([[m1]]τη, [[T ]]τη) = [[{m} ∪ aanalz(m1, T )]]τη
∧∀κ ∈ [[T \ k]]τη : D([[m]]τη, κ) = ⊥]
≥ P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m1]]τη, [[T ]]τη) = [[aanalz(m1, T )]]τη
∧∀κ ∈ [[T \ k]]τη : D([[m]]τη, κ) = ⊥]
≥ 1− (P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m1]]τη, [[T ]]τη) 6= [[aanalz(m1, T )]]τη
∨∃κ ∈ [[T \ k]]τη : D([[m]]τη, κ) 6= ⊥])
≥ 1− (P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m1]]τη, [[T ]]τη) 6= [[aanalz(m1, T )]]τη]
+P[τ ← Coinsη(m); ∃κ ∈ [[T \ k]]τη : D([[m]]τη, κ) 6= ⊥])
≥ 1− (ε1(η)+
∑
κ∈[[T \k]]τη
P[τ ← Coinsη(m);D([[m]]τη, κ) 6= ⊥])
≥ 1− (ε1(η)+ ε2(η) · (|T | − 1)),
where ε1, ε2 are the negligible functions from the induction hypothesis and confusion freeness respectively.
• If k 6∈ T , then [[k]]τη 6∈ [[T ]]τη . Next
P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη, [[T ]]τη) = [[aanalz(m, T )]]τη]
= P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη, [[T ]]τη) = [[{m}]]τη]
≥ P[τ ← Coinsη(m); banalz([[m]]τη, [[T ]]τη) = [[{m}]]τη ∧ ∀κ ∈ [[T ]]τη : D([[m]]τη, κ) = ⊥]
= P[τ ← Coinsη(m); [[m]]τη = [[{m}]]τη ∧ ∀κ ∈ [[T ]]τη : D([[m]]τη, κ) = ⊥]
= 1− P[τ ← Coinsη(m); ∃κ ∈ [[T ]]τη : D([[m]]τη, κ) = ⊥]
≥ 1−
∑
κ∈[[T ]]τη
P[τ ← Coinsη(m);D([[m]]τη, κ) = ⊥]
≥ 1− ε(η) · |T |,
where ε is a negligible function due to confusion freeness. 
The following is an extended version of the function psp from [29], which is the computational counterpart of
pattern. This function takes a bitstring as an argument and tries to recover the pattern associated to it. This means that
given as input a sample from [[m]], the function outputs (a renaming of) pattern(m)with high probability. As in [29] we
let f be an arbitrary (but fixed) injective function that associates an identifier (i.e., an element ofNonce∪Key∪Const)
to each bitstring of primitive type (i.e., ν, κ, ς ).
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Definition 6.5. The function psp : Str× P(Str)→Msg is defined by
psp(µ1µ2,U ) = 〈psp(µ1,U ), psp(µ2,U )〉
psp(,U ) =
{
{|psp(D(, κ),U )|}R()f (κ) , if ∃!κ ∈ U s.t. D(, κ) 6= ⊥;
R(), otherwise.
psp(ψ,U ) =
{
hR(ψ)(psp(µ,U )), if ∃!µ ∈ U s.t. V(µ,ψ) = 1;
R(ψ), otherwise.
psp(µ,U ) = f (µ) in any other case.
Theorem 6.6. Let m ∈Msg and let U be a finite subset ofMsg. Then the probability
P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη, [[U ]]τη) 6≈ pattern(m,U )
]
is a negligible function of η.
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the structure of m. We only show here the case m = hr(m1). For the
remaining cases, the proof follows similarly to the one in the original Micciancio–Warinschi [29] paper and therefore
we refer the reader to it.
• If m1 ∈ U then
P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη, [[U ]]τη) ≈ pattern(m,U )]
≥ P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη, [[U ]]τη) ≈ pattern(m,U ) ∧ ∀µ ∈ [[U \ {m1}]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 0]
= P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m1]]τη, [[U ]]τη) ≈ pattern(m1,U ) ∧ ∀µ ∈ [[U \ {m1}]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 0]
= 1− P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m1]]τη, [[U ]]τη) 6≈ pattern(m1,U ) ∨ ∃µ ∈ [[U \ {m1}]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 1]
≥ 1− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m1]]τη, [[U ]]τη) 6≈ pattern(m1,U )
]
+ P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); ∃µ ∈ [[U \ {m1}]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 1
]
≥ 1− ε1(η)− ε2(η),
where ε1 is the negligible function from the induction hypothesis and ε2 is a negligible function from collision
resistance, using that an adversary can compute [[U \ {m1}]]τη .
• If m1 6∈ U , then
P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη, [[U ]]τη) ≈ pattern(m,U )]
= P[psp([[m]]τη, [[U ]]τη) ≈ r ] = P[∀µ ∈ [[U ]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 0].
Therefore
P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη, [[U ]]τη) 6≈ pattern(m,U )] = P[∃µ ∈ [[U ]]τη : V(µ, [[m]]τη) = 1] ≤ ε(η),
where ε is a negligible function due to collision resistance. 
Lemma 6.7. Let m ∈Msg and d ∈ N. Then the probability
P [µ← [[m]]; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) 6≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))]
is a negligible function of η.
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Proof.
P
[
µ← [[m]]; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) ≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))]
= P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη, bclosure([[m]]τη, d)) ≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))]
≥ P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη, bclosure([[m]]τη, d)) ≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))
∧ bclosure([[m]]τη, d) = [[aclosure(m, d)]]τη
]
= P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη, [[aclosure(m, d)]]τη) ≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))
∧ bclosure([[m]]τη, d) = [[aclosure(m, d)]]τη
]
≥ 1− P[τ ← Coinsη(m); psp([[m]]τη, [[aclosure(m, d)]]τη) 6≈ pattern(m, aclosure(m, d))]
−P[τ ← Coinsη(m); bclosure([[m]]τη, d) 6= [[aclosure(m, d)]]τη]
≥ 1− ε1(η)− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); bclosure([[m]]τη, d, brecover([[m]]τη))
6= [[aclosure(m, d, arecover(m))]]τη
]
(where ε1 is the negligible function due to Theorem 6.6)
≥ 1− ε1(η)− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); bclosure([[m]]τη, d, brecover([[m]]τη)) 6= [[aclosure(m, d, arecover(m))]]τη
∨[[arecover(m)]]τη 6= brecover([[m]]τη)
]
≥ 1− ε1(η)− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); bclosure([[m]]τη, d, [[arecover(m)]]τη) 6= [[aclosure(m, d, arecover(m))]]τη
∨[[arecover(m)]]τη 6= brecover([[m]]τη)
]
≥ 1− ε1(η)− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m); bclosure([[m]]τη, d, [[arecover(m)]]τη) 6= [[aclosure(m, d, arecover(m))]]τη
]
−P[τ ← Coinsη(m); [[arecover(m)]]τη 6= brecover([[m]]τη)]
≥ 1− ε1(η)− ε2(η)− P
[
τ ← Coinsη(m);
bclosure([[m]]τη, d, [[arecover(m)]]τη) 6= [[aclosure(m, d, arecover(m))]]τη
]
(where ε2 is the negligible function due to Lemma 6.2)
≥ 1− ε1(η)− ε2(η)− ε3(η),
where ε3 is the negligible function due to Lemma 6.4. 
Theorem 6.8 (Completeness). Let m1 and m2 be acyclic messages. Then [[m1]] ≡ [[m2]] =⇒ m1 ∼= m2.
Proof. Let us assume that m1 6∼= m2. Now we show that [[m1]] 6≡ [[m2]] by building a distinguisher D.
algorithm D(µ) :
d := max(|m1|, |m2|)
if psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) ≈ pattern(m1)
return 1
else
return 0
Note that for a randomly chosen µ ← [[m1]]η computing D(µ) takes, with overwhelming probability, a polynomial
amount of time since psp runs with overwhelming probability in polynomial time and bclosure is of polynomial
complexity.
Next we show that AdvD(η) = |P[µ← [[m1]]η; D(µ) = 1] − P[µ← [[m2]]η; D(µ) = 1]| is not negligible. On
the one hand
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P[µ← [[m1]]η; D(µ) = 1] = P[µ← [[m1]]η; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) ≈ pattern(m1)]
= 1− P[µ← [[m1]]η; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) 6≈ pattern(m1)]
≥ 1− ε1(η),
where ε1 is the negligible function from Lemma 6.7. Note that pattern(m1) = pattern(m1, aclosure(m1, |m1|)). On
the other hand
P[µ← [[m2]]η; D(µ) = 1] = P[µ← [[m2]]η; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) ≈ pattern(m1)]
≤ P[µ← [[m2]]η; psp(µ, bclosure(µ, d)) 6≈ pattern(m2)]
≤ ε2(η),
where ε2 is the negligible function from Lemma 6.7. Therefore, AdvD(η) = 1 − ε1(η) − ε2(η), which is not
negligible. 
7. Active adversaries
We now briefly turn our attention to active adversaries. One could view the passive adversaries we have been
considering up to now as being given the transcript of a protocol run and trying to deduce information from that. The
soundness and completeness results say that the information an adversary could learn in the computational setting is
the same as in the symbolic one. Active adversaries, however, can also try to inject messages in the network while the
protocol is running. Hence, to obtain a soundness result, every meaningful message that an adversary could send in
the computational world, should also be sendable in the symbolic world. Just as IND-CPA is not strong enough for
encryption schemes for this to hold – one needs non-malleability [30,24,28] – oracle hashing is not strong enough for
hashes.
We now show an explicit example of an oracle hash scheme where an adversary is capable of creating more
messages in the computational world than in the symbolic world.
Let p = 2q + 1 be a large (i.e., scaling with η) safe prime. Consider the oracle hash H(x) = 〈r2, r2· f (x) mod p〉
from Section 3.3. Assume that f is homomorphic for arguments up to length 2η, i.e., f (x + y) = f (x) f (y) mod q
when x + y < 2η. For instance, one could take f (x) = gx mod q when x < 2η and f (x) = h(x) otherwise,
assuming that q is also a safe prime, g is a generator of the quadratic residues modulo q, and h is a collision resistant
one-way function. For simplicity, ignore the tagged representation (see Section 4) and assume that the representation
of the concatenation of two nonces is just ν′ν = 2η · ν′ + ν. Then
H(ν′ν) = H(2η · ν′ + ν)
= (r2, r2· f (2η·ν′+ν) mod p) (for some r )
= (r2, r2· f (ν′)2η f (ν) mod p) (since r2q = 1 mod p)
= (r2, (r2· f (ν)) f (ν′)2η mod p).
Therefore, in the computational world with this particular oracle hash, an attacker receiving H(ν) = (r2, r2· f (ν)) is
capable of producing H(ν′ν) for a nonce ν′ of her own choice. In the symbolic world, however, this is impossible
since hr (n′, n) is not in the closure of {hr(n), n′}.
Next, we show a very simple one-way authentication protocol that, implemented with a malleable oracle hash
function, results in a broken implementation. In this protocol, principal B authenticates to principal A, with whom he
shares a symmetric key kAB . The protocol is the following
(1) A→ B : n
(2) B → A : h(kAB, n).
Consider a homomorphic implementation H of h, as before. Now suppose that the attacker sees a protocol run: A
sends to B a nonce ν, then B replies H(κAB, ν). Later, the attacker is able to answer a new challenge ν′ by sending
H(κAB, ν) ·H(ν′ − ν) to A. This results in a successful impersonation of B by the attacker.
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The conclusion is that oracle hashing is not strong enough to give a perfect correspondence between the symbolic
world and the computational world when the adversary is active. Just as for encryption schemes, what would be
needed is a concept of non-malleability [18] for hashes.
8. Conclusions and future work
We have proposed an interpretation for formal hashes that is computationally sound and complete in the standard
model. Under standard assumptions on hashes (pre-image and collision resistance), the symbolic world does not
perfectly match the computational world. However, our results show that it is still possible to achieve this perfect
match, for passive adversaries, using Canetti’s oracle hashing. While considering active adversaries, we have shown
that the security definition for oracle hashing is not strong enough. It would be interesting to extend the notion of
non-malleability to hashes to achieve this perfect match also for active adversaries.
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